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CASE NOTE
ABDULLAHI V. PFIZER: SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS A NONCONSENSUAL




United States courts struggle to determine what international
human rights violations and against what violators could be raised
under the Alien Tort Statute by non-U.S. citizens. In 2009, the Second
Circuit's majority in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. found that nonconsensual
medical experimentation on humans violated a universally accepted
norm of customary international law. The court found that the
jurisdictional grounds under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") existed so
that non-U.S. citizens could bring these claims to U.S. district courts.
By integrating the principles outlined in Sosa, the court formulated
clear criteria for determination of whether an alleged transgression of
international law constitutes a norm of the law of nations and thus
represents a triable issue under the ATS. The Abdullahi case also
demonstrates a clear potential for international medical research to be
exploitive in nature. If global medical research is to be safely
accomplished, the international community will be forced to address the
issue through application of international and comparative law. This
case note provides in-depth analysis of the Abdullahi case and explores
its implications on future ATS litigation.
INTRODUCTION
It is universally accepted that administering medical experiments
on human subjects without their knowledge or consent is unethical and
immoral. For most people, the subject of nonconsensual
experimentation on humans brings up memory of the atrocious Nazi
medical experiments conducted on concentration camp prisoners,' or of
* University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, J.D. '12. The author thanks Professor
Brittany Glidden for her insightful comments, Julie Nichols for her editing suggestions,
and my husband John Lear for his amazing support.
1. United States v. Brandt, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 181-82 (1949) [hereinafter
Brandt].
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the Tuskegee experiments on poor African-American men. 2 Despite
agreement that such experimentation is unacceptable and is prohibited
within the United States,3 the role of domestic courts in adjudicating
these and other violations of international law remains uncertain and
highly controversial. 4 Specifically, United States courts have struggled
to determine what international human rights violations could be
raised by non-U.S. citizens or aliens and what violators could be sued
under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS").6
In January 2009, in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., the Second Circuit's
majority found that nonconsensual medical experimentation on humans
violated a universally accepted norm of customary international law.6
The Abdullahi suit was brought by Nigerian children and their
guardians alleging that Pfizer conducted medical experimentations of a
new drug on the children without their informed consent during a
bacterial meningitis outbreak in Nigeria in 1996.7 Plaintiffs asserted
that, as a result of the new drug trials on two hundred children, eleven
children died, and many others were left with permanent blindness,
brain damage, loss of hearing, or paralysis. 8 The Second Circuit found
that jurisdiction existed under the ATS, allowing the foreign plaintiffs'
claims of nonconsensual medical testing to proceed.9 Significantly, the
Abdullahi court allowed private causes of action to be brought under
the ATS as long as "the violations occurred as the result of concerted
action" by the private individuals or organizations working together
with the state government. 10
This case comment provides in-depth analysis of the Abdullahi case
and explores the implications of the Abdullahi decision for future cases
brought to U.S. federal courts under the ATS. First, Part I surveys
formation and significant developments of the ATS. Second, Part II
provides the factual background and the procedural history of the case.
Third, Part III examines the majority's holding and reasoning as well as
discusses the dissenting opinion. Finally, Part IV addresses
implications of the Abdullahi decision on the ATS jurisprudence and
post-Abdullahi developments.
2. U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, available at http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/index.html.
3. General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012); see also
21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2012).
4. See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States,
58 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 472-73 (2010).
5. Id. at 473; Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
6. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Abdullahi].
7. Id. at 169-70.
8. Id. at 169.
9. Id. at 187.
10. Id. at 188-89.
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The Alien Tort Statute
The First Congress originally passed the ATS in 1789 allowing non-
U.S. citizens to sue "for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or treaty of the United States."" The statute grants federal
jurisdiction for suits alleging (1) torts committed anywhere in the world
(2) against a non-U.S. citizen who brings the action (3) in violation of
the law of nations. 12 Some courts and legal scholars consider the ATS
as having a "strictly jurisdictional nature" in the sense that the
statutory provision grants jurisdiction to federal courts without a
substantive power to create new causes of action.13 At the time of
enactment the ATS had a practical application for a limited set of
actions that asserted violations of the law of nations. 14 Specifically, the
ATS has been traditionally limited to claims for crimes against
ambassadors, violations of the right to safe passage, and crimes of
piracy.15 Because of the scarce legislative history and conflicting
historical interpretations of the ATS, non-American citizens randomly
invoked the statute to seek redress for violations of international law in
U.S. federal courts until 1980.16
While the ATS is a simple statute on its face, courts have struggled
to identify the requirements that a non-U.S. citizen must satisfy in
order to bring an ATS claim in a U.S. federal court. 17 Starting in 1980
with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a number of cases attempted to clarify and
expand its statutory application to allow for new causes of action.18 In
Filartiga, after comprehensive examinations of numerous sources of
customary international law condemning the acts of torture, the Second
Circuit concluded that the right to be free from torture was proscribed
by the law of nations. 19 Because torture committed by state officials or
under the color of official authority violated universally accepted norms
of international law, the torture claim by non-U.S. citizens could be
brought under the ATS.20 Implicit in this finding is the notion that "a
state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 n.10
(2004) (explaining that the statute has been modified slightly since its initial enactment
in 1789) [hereinafter Sosa].
12. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Kadic].
13. Sosa, supra note 11, at 713.
14. Id. at 720.
15. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 173.
16. Sosa, supra note 11, at 712-13; see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-
88 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Filartiga].
17. See Sosa, supra note 11, at 720-21.
18. Id. at 724-25; Kadic, supra note 12, at 241-44; see Filartiga, supra note 16, at 880.
19. Filartiga, supra note 16, at 884-85. In Filartiga, the relatives of a victim brought
the ATS action against a Paraguayan Police General who kidnapped and tortured to
death the 17-year old victim in retaliation for the family's political activities.
20. Id. at 880.
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concern."2' The Filartiga court found that there was an international
consensus against the use of torture supported by numerous
international treaties and accords. 22 The issue of whether torture is a
norm of customary international law actionable under the ATS was
resolved. The ATS question after Filartiga became: What does it take
for a well recognized norm of international law to qualify as the "law of
nations" in order for a U.S. federal court to exercise federal
jurisdiction? 23
Fifteen years after the Filartiga decision, the Second Circuit
addressed another ATS issue of who could be held liable under the
ATS. 24 The court in Kadic v. Karadzic held that "certain forms of
conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals."25 In Kadic,
a group of victims of Bosnian war brought claims of crimes of genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape, forced prostitution, and
forced pregnancy against the self proclaimed Bosnian-Serb leader. 26
The Kadic court emphasized that private persons might be found liable
under the ATS for violations of international humanitarian law,
genocide, and war crimes. 27 In addition, the court found the plaintiffs
satisfied the state action requirement for other crimes by showing that
the Bosnian-Serb leader acted under color of law because he acted in
concert with the state officials of the former Yugoslavia. 28 Later, some
courts also held that because the ATS contains no express exception for
corporations, the statute grants jurisdiction over torture claims against
corporate defendants. 29
Finally, in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the scope of
the ATS. In the seminal opinion, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Justice
Souter outlined the framework for determining whether a claim
properly asserts a violation of a norm of customary international law,
21. Id. at 881.
22. Id. at 882-84.
23. Id. at 880-81; see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the ATS creates a cause of action for violations of specific,
universal and obligatory international human rights standards).
24. Kadic, supra note 12, at 239.
25. Id.; see also Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009)
(finding that private parties, both individuals and corporations, may be liable for a
violation of the law of nations under the ATS).
26. Kadic, supra note 12, at 237.
27. Id. at 239-40.
28. Id. at 245.
29. The language of the statute limits who may sue and for what violations, but it
does not limit who may be sued. See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303,
1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d
Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
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thus supporting a cause of action under the ATS.so In order for a
violation of the law of nations to be actionable under the ATS, the norm
prohibiting such violation must be "defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms" such as
transgression of the rights of ambassadors, piracy crimes, and
violations of safe conducts or passports. 31 The Supreme Court explained
that torts in violation of the customary international law could be
defined by common law because nothing has precluded federal courts
from "recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of
common law."32 Nevertheless, because the understanding of federal
common law drastically changed in 1938 when the watershed opinion in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins rejected the concept of federal "general"
common law, the Supreme Court warned courts to exercise caution
when finding actionable norms under the ATS. 33 Thus, the Sosa court
called for judicial restraint in creating new private causes of actions
under the ATS emphasizing potential encroachment on the
decisionmaking region of Legislative and Executive branches. 34
In a nutshell, the federal courts can allow new private causes of
actions for international law violations to be brought under the ATS but
only when these norms have been accepted by civilized nations and are
shown to be analogous to the historic crimes against ambassadors,
piracy, and violation of safe conducts. 35 The Court explained that the
ATS affords jurisdiction to a very limited set of actions asserting
violations of international legal norms that are (1) specific, (2)
universal, and (3) well-recognized by most civilized nations that
consider these norms obligatory.36 While the Supreme Court admitted
that federal courts do have a capacity to adjudicate enforceable
international legal norms, it also called for "great caution" in applying
the law of nations and creating new private causes of actions under the
ATS. 37
CASE SUMMARY
In 1996, Pfizer, Inc., one of the world's largest pharmaceutical
companies, took advantage of a large outbreak of bacterial meningitis in
Nigeria, using it as an opportunity to test an unapproved and
30. Sosa, supra note 11, at 720, 724-26.
31. Id. at 724-25.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 726; see also Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 68 (1938).
34. See Sosa, supra note 11, at 727.
35. Id. at 725.
36. Id. at 732.
37. Id. at 728-29.
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potentially harmful medication.38 In order to get the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration's ("FDA") approval for the use of Trovafloxacin
Mesylate ("Trovan") on children in the U.S., Pfizer conducted a medical
research study for the new antibiotic on two hundred Nigerian children
sick with meningitis.39 Pfizer sent American doctors to conduct
experiments together with Nigerian doctors at the Infectious Disease
Hospital, a public hospital located in Kano, which is in the north of
Nigeria. 40 The company's goal was to obtain the FDA's approval of
Trovan through its comparison with another antibiotic Ceftriaxone.41
Financial analysts predicted at that time that Trovan would bring the
company a billion U.S. dollars in revenue if approved by the FDA.42
While Ceftriaxone is a well-established and FDA-approved antibiotic for
safe and effective treatment of bacterial meningitis in both adults and
children, preliminary animal trials of Trovan revealed severe side
effects, including degenerative joint disease, liver damage, and
abnormal bone conditions.43 Undeterred by these initial alarming
findings, Pfizer proceeded with the experiments. The researchers
divided the sick children in two groups: one group received the new
drug Trovan, while the other group received Ceftriaxone.44
This experiment was conducted without the patients' consent or
knowledge that they were experiment subjects. Plaintiffs claimed that
both American and Nigerian doctors working for Pfizer intentionally
failed to inform the children and their parents that the medical
experiments were being conducted. The doctors also failed to advise
Plaintiffs about the serious health risks involved in the drug studies.
Possibly the most appalling allegation of all was that the doctors failed
to inform Plaintiffs that a safe and effective alternative treatment for
meningitis was available at the same hospital through the non-
governmental organization "Doctors Without Borders."45 In their
lawsuit, Plaintiffs also alleged that Pfizer deliberately administered
lower doses of Ceftriaxone to the second group in order to boost the
effectiveness of Trovan in comparison to Ceftriaxone.46 Moreover, the
Pfizer doctors neglected to provide any follow-up medical care to the
38. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pfizer, Inc. v. Abdullahi, 130 S. Ct. 3541
(2010) (No. 09-34).
39. Id.
40. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 169.
41. Id.
42. Joe Stephens, Where Profit and Lives Hang in Balance, WASHINGTON POST (Dec.
17, 2000), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
07/02/AR2007070201255.html.
43. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 169.
44. Id.




treated children after the conclusion of the medical experiments.47
Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the Trovan medical trials, eleven
children died and many others were left to suffer paralysis, brain
damage, or permanent sight or hearing loss. 4 8 Following the medical
experiments on the Nigerian children, the FDA never approved Trovan
for use on children and eventually severely restricted use of Trovan
even for adults. 49 Trovan was completely banned by the European
Union in 1999.50
Following these events, the injured children and their families
sought legal relief. In 2001, the injured Nigerian children and their
guardians brought a tort action against Pfizer under the ATS asserting
violations of customary international law (the Abdullahi action).51
Meanwhile, another group of plaintiffs brought a suit against Pfizer in
a federal court in Nigeria under the Nigerian law (the Adamu action).52
However, the Nigerian lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed by the
plaintiffs due to alleged corruption in the Nigerian legal system and the
plaintiffs' inability to obtain legal redress in Nigeria.53 The Adamu
plaintiffs then brought a lawsuit in the U.S, which was then
consolidated with the Abdullahi action.54 The district court granted
Pfizer's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under the ATS.
The district court dismissed the claim on the grounds of forum non
conveniens on the condition that Pfizer agreed to litigate the lawsuit in
Nigeria.55 Plaintiffs appealed the dismissals to the Second Circuit,
which reversed and remanded on appeal for the reasons explained
below. 56
Majority's and Dissent's Opinions
In Abdullahi, the Second Circuit majority undertook a
comprehensive analysis of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS
within the parameters outlined by the Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa.
By integrating the principles identified by the Second Circuit in
Filartiga, Kadic, and Flores57 with those provided by Sosa, the court
47. Id. at 169-70.
48. Id. at 170.
49. Company News; Suspension of Trovan Drug in Europe Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 1999), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/12/business/company-news-
suspension-of-trovan-drug-in-europe-is-urged.html.
50. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 170.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 170-71.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 171.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 168-69.
57. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Flores].
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formulated clear criteria for determination of whether an alleged
transgression of international law constitutes a norm of the law of
nations and thus represents a triable issue under the ATS.
The Second Circuit clarified that a norm of international law
actionable under the ATS must be a norm that is (1) universally
adhered to by States out of sense of legal obligation, (2) specific and
definable, and (3) of "mutual" concern to States as opposed to "several"
concern to individual States.68
Sources of International Law
The court started its analysis with the examination of various
sources of international law.5 9 In determining whether nonconsensual
medical experimentation rises to the norm of international customary
law, the Second Circuit referred to the four sources listed in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: (1) "international
conventions" or treaties expressly accepted by States; (2) "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law"; (3) "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"; and (4)
"judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations" as a secondary source of legal rules.60
As evidence of customary international law prohibiting nonconsensual
medical experimentations on human subjects, Plaintiffs cited the
Nuremberg Code,6 1 the World Medical Association's Declaration of
Helsinki, 62 the Ethical Guidelines by the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Services, 63 and article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").64
The court admitted that none of the international legal authorities,
except the ICCPR, had been ratified by the U.S., and thus these
authorities, taken individually, would not have binding legal power in
U.S. federal courts. Nevertheless, the court also said that these non-
obligatory international legal norms "may, with time and in conjunction
with state practice, provide evidence that a norm has developed the
specificity, universality, and obligatory nature required for ATS
58. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 174.
59. Id. at 174-75.
60. Id. at 175 (citing Statute of International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1 U.N.T.S 993).
61. Id. (citing Brandt, supra note 1, at 181-82).
62. Id. (citing World Med. Ass'n, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, arts. 20, 22 (June 1964) (amended through
October 2008), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/l0policies/b3/17c.pdf).
63. Id. (citing Council for Int'l Orgs. of Med. Serv., International Ethical Guidelines
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, guideline 4 (3d ed. 2002), [hereinafter
Council for Int'l Orgs. of Med. Serv.], available at http://www.cioms.ch/publications
/guidelines/guidelinesnov_2002).
64. Id. (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]).
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jurisdiction." 65 The court further clarified that the scope of inquiry must
be not whether each source of international legal authority is binding by
itself but rather whether "a greater range of evidence" has been
considered and whether the probative value of all the sources taken as
a whole amounts to sufficient evidence of the current state of customary
international law.6 6 Thus, even international agreements that are not
self-executing or that have not been ratified by the United States can
constitute evidence of the norm of customary international law broadly
accepted by the international community. 67
Principles of Universality
In order to properly bring a claim under the ATS, plaintiffs must
assert a violation of a norm of customary international law that is
universally accepted around the world as a binding legal obligation. 68
The court concluded that the prohibition of nonconsensual medical
experimentations, originally identified at the Nuremberg war crimes
trials, clearly represented such norm.6 9 The court's strongest reasoning
for finding the international agreement to prohibit nonconsensual
experimentation came from the fact that at least eighty-four countries
now require the informed consent from participants for purposes of
medical experimentations. 70  Through the advancements of
international conventions as well as development of domestic
regulations, the informed consent norm "has become firmly embedded
and has secured universal acceptance in the community of nations."71
Principles of Specificity
The court also stated that a norm of customary international law
must be "sufficiently specific." To be "sufficiently specific," the norm
must be analogous to the 18th-century paradigms of crimes against
ambassadors, piracy, or infringement on the right of safe conduct. 72
According to the victims' allegations, Pfizer failed to inform any of the
children or their guardians of the nature and risks of the medical
experiments despite the fact that the company was well aware of the
informed consent requirements. In other words, Pfizer doctors acted
knowingly and purposefully when they nonetheless proceeded with
65. Abdullahi, supra note 6, 176 (citing Filartiga, supra note 16, at 883).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 177.
69. Id.; see also ICCPR, supra note 65, art. 7; Brandt, supra note 1, at 181-82; Council
for Int'l Orgs. of Med. Serv., supra note 64, at guideline 4.
70. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 181.
71. Id. at 183-84.
72. Id. at 184.
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medical research.73 The court found that the Nigerian victims alleged
ample facts that Pfizer knowingly and purposefully conducted the
medical experiments in a harmful manner.7 4 Thus, the allegations
against the Pfizer doctors, if proven true, would preclude any
assumptions of simple negligence in failure to inform the participants of
the nature and risks of the medical experiments.75 The court concluded
that prohibition of nonconsensual medical testing is "sufficiently
specific" the same way the customary international law prohibits
piracy. 76
Principles of Mutual Concern
The court also required examination of a norm of customary
international law from the perspective of the "mutual concern" to
States. When nations act in concert with each other out of a sense of
mutual concern, the nations make it their intention to prohibit certain
conduct that they collectively find reprehensible. Unlike matters of
"several concern" that involve issues in which individual States are only
"separately and independently interested," matters of "mutual concern"
encompass the objective of maintaining international peace and
stability. 77 In other words, matters of "mutual concern" compel nations
to cooperate with each other on eliminating mutually unwanted conduct
through the means of international conventions and agreements in
order to preserve international security and public health. 78
By conducting involuntary medical experimentations, the court
found that Pfizer threatened international efforts to prevent the spread
of contagious diseases across the international borders by fostering
mistrust and opposition not only to future drug trials but also to vital
public health programs organized by pharmaceutical companies. 79 For
example, after the reports about the Trovan medical trials resulting in
alleged deaths of the children came out in Nigeria, the local population
boycotted polio vaccination efforts in 2004, in part because of the
Trovan drug experiments.80 The resistance to polio vaccinations in
Nigeria resulted in the spread of the disease across Africa and the
73. Id.; but see Viet. Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d
104, 121-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that because the plaintiffs did not allege that the
chemical was sprayed with the purpose to injure human population, "they fail[ed] to make
out a cognizable basis for their ATS claim.").
74. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 184-85.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 184.
77. Id. at 185 (quoting Flores, supra note 58, at 249).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 186.
80. See Poliomyelitis in Nigeria and West/Central Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June
18, 2008), available at http://www.who.int/csr/doni/2008_06_18/en/index.html.
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Middle East.8 ' In addition, the court found that nonconsensual medical
trials conducted by American drug companies could contribute to
growing anti-U.S. sentiments around the world, further threatening the
already-volatile international security.82
The State Action Requirement
The court looked to the "color of law" jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to determine whether a state action requirement was satisfied.8 3
When a private individual acts together with state officials or with
substantial state aid, the individual acts under "color of law."84 The
Second Circuit concluded that a private cause of action under the ATS
could proceed as long as the private individual or organization "acted in
concert with" the state actor under the color of law.8 5 In Abdullahi, the
court found sufficiently close relationship between Pfizer and the
Nigerian governmental representatives who allegedly were involved in
every stage of the drug trials.86 Because the alleged illegal conduct took
place with substantial help of Nigerian doctors in a public hospital
provided to Pfizer by the local government specifically to conduct the
medical trials, the court concluded that the illegal conduct was the
"concerted action" between the American drug company and the
Nigerian government.8 7
The Dissenting Opinion
Although Judge Wesley agreed with the framework the majority
used to analyze claims under the ATS, he rejected the notion of private
cause of actions brought under the ATS.8 8 Judge Wesley maintained
that the correct application of Sosa framework to Abdullahi facts would
not result in the jurisdictional grant for nonconsensual medical
experimentations claims against private actors.8 9 He insisted that
nonconsensual medial experimentation "more closely resembles the acts
for which only state actors may be held responsible."9 0 Judge Wesley
reasoned that international law would only allow federal court
jurisdiction over private actors under the ATS when the conduct in
question is beyond the reach of any state, such as in crimes of piracy.
81. Id.
82. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 187; see also Timothy S. Jost, The Globalization of
Health Law: The Case of Permissibility of Placebo-Based Research, 26 AM. J.L. & MED.
175, 175 (2000).
83. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 188.
84. Kadic, supra note 12, at 245.
85. Id.
86. Abdullahi, supra note 6, at 188.
87. Id. at 188-89.
88. Id. at 192-93 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 209.
90. Id. at 206.
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Because violations of medical experimentation fall under the
jurisdiction of domestic courts, these crimes cannot be incorporated by
analogy to crimes against ambassadors, piracy, and violation of safe
conducts as to reach private, non-state actors under the ATS. 91 With
respect to the sources of customary international laws accepted as
evidence by the majority, Judge Wesley concluded that the evidence
presented by plaintiffs was merely aspirational and insufficient to
uphold ATS jurisdiction for the private right of action. 92
Implications of Abdullahi Decision
It is undisputed that administering involuntarily medical
experimentation on humans without their consent is unethical, morally
reprehensible, and illegal. The controversy centers on whether such
conduct is a recognized norm of international law actionable under the
ATS. In reaching its conclusion that a nonconsensual medical
experimentation constitutes a norm of customary international law
actionable under the ATS, the Abdullahi majority carefully followed the
Sosa framework to the extent Sosa provided guidance. The Supreme
Court in Sosa affirmed that the ATS is purely jurisdictional. At the
same time, it did not preclude federal courts from recognizing new
norms of international law, even absent express statutory authority.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court in Sosa provided some
guideposts for determination of customary international law norms, the
Court evaded laying out a clear and functional framework clarifying
what causes of actions could be actionable under the ATS. The matter is
further complicated by the fact that Congress has not clarified the scope
and implications of the ATS.93
Although the Abdullahi opinion has been broadly criticized, 94 there
are two reasons to believe that the Second Circuit decided the case in
accordance with the framework outlined in Sosa. First, the Supreme
Court has denied the Pfizer's petition for a writ of certiorari, thus
rejecting an opportunity to overrule or correct the ATS framework set
forth by the Second Circuit in Abdullahi.95 The Supreme Court's denial
could also mean that either the factual basis of the case was not
adequate to warrant the Court's review of the ATS or that the issue was
not sufficiently important to the Court. In any case, the denial of the
91. Id.
92. Id. at 194-95, 198.
93. Flores, supra note 58, at 246.
94. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Dennis M. Coyne, International Pharmaceutical Mistrials: Existing Law for the Protection
of Foreign Human Subjects and Proposal for Reform, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 427, 428 (2011).
95. Warren Richey, Supreme Court Allows Drug Test Case Against Pfizer to Proceed,




writ of certiorari means that the Abdullahi decision stays as the
mandatory authority for the ATS claims within the Second Circuit's
jurisdiction.
Second, the fact that Congress has not acted in response to the
Abdullahi decision by expressly prohibiting suits by victims of
nonconsensual medical experimentations under the ATS might be a
good sign. Following the court's decision in Filartiga, Congress passed
the Torture Victim Protection Act in 1991 ("TVPA"), which specifically
allowed individuals to bring civil actions suits against "any individual
who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture."9 6 Moreover, the House
Report on the TVPA expressly referred to the Filartiga case with a
comment approving the Filartiga court's reasoning.9 7 In other words, by
passing the TVPA, Congress authorized the cause of action for torture
that has been recognized in Filartiga under the ATS. 98 It is reasonable
to draw parallels with the Filartiga case and anticipate that Congress
would be influenced by the Abdullahi decision holding that the
involuntarily medical experimentation contravenes the universally
accepted norms of customary international law.
It is important to note what issues the Abdullahi decision did not
address. While the Second Circuit in Abdullahi focused on whether
nonconsensual medical experimentation constituted a norm of
customary international law, the court did not address another
important matter: who could be sued as a violator under the ATS. Most
recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in
another Second Circuit's ATS case also brought by Nigerians. In Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nigerian plaintiffs brought claims
against the multinational oil company alleging extrajudicial killing,
torture, and crimes against humanity.99 The plaintiffs claimed that the
company collaborated with the Nigerian government to commit these
violations of customary international law in response to the plaintiffs'
legitimate protests against oil exploration and production destroying
the local environment. The Second Circuit majority held that
corporations, unlike States and individuals, could not be held liable for
human rights violations. The court explained that although
corporations are considered "persons" under U.S. domestic law, such
liability under domestic law does not create a norm of customary
international law actionable against corporations under the ATS. Faced
with a high probability that the Supreme Court would affirm the
96. Flores, supra note 58, at 246-47 & n.21.
97. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85.
98. Kadic, supra note 12, at 241.
99. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
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Second Circuit's decision in favor of the corporate defendants resulting
in future inability of non-U.S. citizen victims to bring ATS claims
against corporations, the Abdullahi plaintiffs agreed to settle with
Pfizer. 100
CONCLUSION
The rapid globalization of medical research of new drugs and
heated debates around ethics of international medical research have
exposed the vulnerability of human research subjects in developing
countries suffering from widespread poverty, lack of education, and
corrupt authorities. The Abdullahi case demonstrates a clear potential
for international medical research to be exploitive in nature. If global
medical research is to be safely and ethically accomplished, the
international community will be forced to address the issue through
application of international and comparative law. 101 The Abdullahi
decision sends a plain message of intolerance of nonconsensual medical
testing to not only large multinational pharmaceutical companies but
also the international community at large. While Congress has yet to
pass any legislation codifying the Abdullahi approach and creating a
statutory cause of action for nonconsensual medical testing under the
ATS, the Abdullahi opinion could serve as a catalyst for congressional
action. The growing ATS litigation will help further assimilation of
international human rights law into the U.S. legal system and will
likely lead to further developments of new norms of customary
international law actionable under the ATS.
It is important to remember that the ATS is not just a monetary
redress, but also an avenue to tell the story of injustice for victims and
publicly name the perpetrators of abuse. Even though the ATS is a civil
statute, its goal is nevertheless to bring those guilty for serious human
right violations to answer for their actions. The ATS litigation also
facilitates better understanding of the role of international legal norms
within the U.S. legal system. The cases brought under the ATS also
help create a record of human rights violations precipitating changes in
the countries where violations took place. Most importantly, ATS
litigation helps bring worldwide awareness to human rights causes or
create political pressure necessary for changes to prevent future abuses.
100. See Sue Reisinger, Pfizer Settles Lawsuits Over Drug Trials on Children in
Nigeria, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticle
CC.jsp?id=1202482854504 (discussing that while the settlement is confidential, Pfizer
established the trust fund that would pay a maximum of $175,000 per child to those able
to prove death or permanent disability due to the Trovan drug trial).
101. See Jost, supra note 83, at 175-76; James V. Lavery, Putting International
Research Ethics Guidelines to Work for the Benefit of Developing Countries, 4 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 319, 320-22 (2004).
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CASE NOTE
The Filartiga court emphasized that "for purposes of civil liability,
the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."102 Whether through
the Abdullahi court's application of the ATS, a Supreme Court's
opinion, or a Congressional act, the American society has the
responsibility to ensure that the medical researchers, both individuals
and corporations, conducting nonconsensual harmful medical
experiments on human beings abroad become the "enemies of all
mankind."
102. Filartiga, supra note 16, at 890.
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